For DoD and installed-base industrial contexts
Last reviewed: December 2025
Change log: Initial publication
Download: Obsolescence & DMSMS Risk Triage Checklist
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Obsolescence and DMSMS are rarely “surprise” events. The signals show up early—last-time-buy notices, aging fabs, shrinking supplier lists—but they’re often scattered across inboxes, spreadsheets, and tribal knowledge.
Handled well, obsolescence becomes routine portfolio maintenance. Handled poorly, it becomes a readiness emergency: line-down events, rushed redesigns, and expensive one-off miracles.
This guide lays out a practical way to:
- Triage obsolescence/DMSMS risk at the NSN/part level
- Decide when to stock, substitute, redesign, or retire
- Tie part-level risk back to platforms, programs, and contracts
It is written for engineers, program managers, and buyers supporting legacy DoD and industrial systems, not for green-field product development.
Scope and Assumptions
Focus:
- Legacy electronics and electro-mechanical assemblies in active service
- Obsolescence of ICs, passive components, connectors, interconnects, and mechanical parts
- Situations where redesign is possible but not always desirable
Context:
- DoD systems, DLA spares, and installed-base industrial/semiconductor tools
- Mixed environment of OEM drawings, vendor data sheets, and field modifications
No implied compliance:
- This guide uses common DMSMS terminology; it does not claim compliance with any particular standard or MIL-handbook
- Always defer to program-specific DMSMS plans and contractual requirements
The Three-Layer View
Think about obsolescence at three layers:
1. Part Level – “What is going obsolete?”
- Specific manufacturer part numbers and alternates
- Technology families (e.g., certain memory, process nodes, packages)
2. Assembly / NSN Level – “Where does it sit?”
- Which LRUs, cards, and NSNs use the part
- How critical the function is (safety, mission, readiness impact)
3. Platform / Program Level – “What happens if it disappears?”
- Fleet size and remaining service life
- Reorder patterns and support commitments
Many teams burn time arguing about the part in isolation. The right decision usually depends on the assembly and platform layers.
A Quick Triage Method
For each at-risk item, walk through:
1. How hard is it to replace?
- Drop-in electrical/thermal equivalent exists → lower engineering burden
- FFF replacement requires layout or mechanical changes → medium burden
- No obvious replacement; custom or ITAR-sensitive → high burden
2. How critical is the function?
- Non-critical / cosmetic → more inventory and lighter engineering is acceptable
- Performance-critical but not safety-critical → moderate rigor
- Safety, mission, or readiness-critical → bias toward robust evidence and planning
3. What is the demand and horizon?
- Low demand, short remaining life → last-time buy may be sufficient
- Steady demand, long horizon → plan for FFF replacement or redesign
- Highly uncertain demand → staged strategy (limited buy + design path)
Typical outcomes:
- Inventory-focused strategy: buy ahead, maintain design as-is
- FFF replacement strategy: engineer equivalent parts into the design
- Redesign strategy: architectural change, consolidation, or digital retrofit
- Retirement strategy: managed “sunset”, cannibalization, or alternative capability
Common Obsolescence Pathways:
- Manufacturer EOL / LTB announced
- Process node or package sunset (e.g., certain leaded packages)
- Supplier acquisition / consolidation that drops low-volume parts
- Regulatory or material changes (e.g., RoHS, REACH constraints)
- Custom / program-unique parts with disappearing tribal knowledge
A “Right-Sized” Obsolescence Plan
A useful plan is a clear argument, not a giant spreadsheet:
1. Scope of Concern
- List parts at risk (MFR PN, CAGE, NSN if applicable)
- Where they live (assemblies, NSNs, platforms)
2. Risk Characterization
- Criticality (safety/mission/readiness)
- Replacement difficulty (low/medium/high)
- Demand and horizon (qty/year, years remaining)
3. Option Space
- Inventory path (how much, where stored, shelf-life issues)
- FFF replacement path (candidate parts, constraints)
- Redesign path (cost, lead time, test implications)
- Retirement path (what replaces the capability)
4. Selected Strategy + Triggers
- What you’re doing now
- What events force re-evaluation (e.g., volume increase, new failure modes)
5. Evidence & Traceability
- Where you keep source data (PCNs, LTB notices, emails, datasheets)
- How decisions are captured for future audits and reorders
Minimum Evidence Pack
At minimum, retain:
- Part and assembly mapping (where the risk shows up)
- Criticality classification and decision notes
- Volume and horizon assumptions (with dates)
- Selected strategy and reasoning
- Links to supporting documents (PCNs, datasheets, test reports)
This is the difference between “we knew it was going obsolete” and “here is why we made this decision at the time.”
Common Ways Teams Get Burned
- Treating every EOL as a crisis instead of a portfolio problem
- Over-buying parts for platforms that are nearly retired
- Under-buying for long-horizon fleets
- Not planning test and qualification effort for FFF replacements
- Losing track of tribal decisions when people move on
Short Checklist
- Parts and assemblies at risk identified?
- Criticality and replacement difficulty classified?
- Demand and service-life assumptions written down?
- Strategy chosen (inventory / FFF / redesign / retire)?
- Test/qualification implications captured?
- Evidence and decisions stored somewhere findable?
FAQs
1. Do I always have to redesign for obsolescence?
No. Often a pure inventory or FFF substitution strategy is both faster and safer, if you can defend it with evidence and have a clear horizon.
2. How far ahead should I plan?
Long enough that you can execute FFF replacements or redesign beforeline-down events. For slow-moving legacy fleets, that often means multiple years of horizon.
3. Who owns obsolescence decisions?
Ideally, a cross-functional view: engineering, supply chain, program management, and sometimes the customer. Unilateral decisions by any one group tend to create surprises.
Author
Michael Cantrell: M.S., Systems Engineering (The George Washington University)
Additional Background: MIT Sloan Executive Certificate (Advanced Certificate for Executives)
Professional Memberships (personal): IEEE; INCOSE; PMI; System Dynamics Society
Memberships are personal and do not imply organizational endorsement.